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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the past twenty-five years, a number of renewable energy 
technologies (RETs), for example wind turbines, have emerged in 
response to both oil crises and to growing environmental problems. 
Some of these technologies are now diffusing rapidly in the global 
market, and a new growth industry is emerging.1 As is commonly the 
case, this growth industry is unevenly distributed across nations.  
As many authors emphasise, the study of the development of a new 
industry requires the use of an analytical framework which includes 
factors that go beyond the individual firm. These are found within the 
particular ‘innovation system’ which the firm is a part of and include 
institutions and networks in addition to markets. The purpose of this 
paper is to analyse how the Swedish innovation system has shaped the 
formation of a local industry that supplies RET.2 
                                                 
1 In reality, this industry consists of several sub-industries with widely differing 
characteristics, but for reasons of simplicity we will treat them as one from here onwards. 
2 Whereas this study is limited to the case of Sweden, we will compare with other countries 
later on in our work. 
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The paper is structured as follows. First, an analytical framework is 
developed. Second, we describe the empirical field and make a 
preliminary assessment of the performance of Swedish industry within 
RET. Third, this performance is explained empirically in terms of 
mechanisms inducing and blocking the industry’s development. Finally, 
we discuss some implications for policy. 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
The process by which new technology emerges and is diffused in 
society, thereby generating new growth industries, can be studied from 
a number of perspectives. The neo-classical economic perspective 
focuses on the influence of changes in relative prices. In contrast, seen 
from the perspective of the entrepreneur, the entrepreneurial act in the 
individual firm is the central feature. These perspectives are not 
irrelevant, but we will develop one which also emphasises that: 
· the innovation and diffusion process is both an individual and a 
collective act; and that 
· the determinants of firm growth are not only to be found within 
individual firms, but also reside in an ‘innovation system’ that 
both aids and constrains the individual firms within it. 
It is the character of this innovation system, which we need to 
comprehend if we are to understand how new growth industries 
emerge. 
Since 1987, when Christopher Freeman published his book on the 
‘Japanese Innovation System’, several system approaches have been 
developed. Some take the country as the unit of analysis and imply that 
differences in their institutional set-up and structure of production 
(their ‘national innovation systems’) influence the behaviour of 
individual firms (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1992; Porter, 1990). Others 
focus on regional innovation systems and elaborate more on cultural 
variables (Maskell, 1997; Saxenian, 1994). Yet others have for some 
time studied industrial networks where firms are tied together in long 
lasting relationships (Håkansson, 1987). Finally, some authors focus on 
‘technological systems’: systems built around specific technologies or 
products (Carlsson, 1995 and 1997; Hughes, 1983; Lundgren, 1991).  
As our objective is to analyse the evolution of a new industry, it is 
necessary for us to employ an analytical framework, which takes into 
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account factors specific to the industry supplying a particular 
technology or product. A technology/product-specific framework is 
particularly useful when competition between various technologies to 
perform a certain function, in this case the supply of energy, is in focus. 
In such cases, the competing technological systems not only generate 
diversity but also constitute the selection environment.3 We have 
therefore opted for the technological system approach as our analytical 
starting point.  
A technological system can be formally defined as ‘...network(s) of 
agents interacting in a specific technology area under a particular 
institutional infrastructure to generate, diffuse, and utilize technology. 
Technological systems are defined in terms of knowledge or 
competence flows rather than flows of ordinary goods and services. 
They consist of dynamic knowledge and competence networks’ 
(Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1991, p. 111). 
Based on this definition, we see that technological systems are made 
up of a number of elements: 
Actors and their competence, technical as well as others. A 
particularly important set of actors are ‘prime movers’ or system 
builders (Hughes, 1983). These are firms, or other actors, which are 
technically, financially and/or politically so powerful that they can 
initiate or strongly contribute to the development and diffusion of a 
new technology. Other key actors are those performing a ‘bridging 
function’, that is connecting actors, for example industry associations or 
technology transfer units at universities. 
Networks, which constitute important routes for the transfer of tacit 
(Metcalfe, 1992) and explicit knowledge.4 In particular, we note 
networks that are conducive to the identification of new problems and 
the development of new technical solutions (often user-supplier 
networks), and more general information diffusion networks. Being 
strongly integrated in a network increases the resource base of the 
individual firm (information, knowledge and so on.) and, therefore, its 
degrees of freedom. The network also influences the perception of 
what is possible and desirable, that is images of the future, which guides 
                                                 
3 Some technological systems can be complementary. For instance wind and hydropower are 
complementary in that the latter is highly flexible whereas the former is erratic in the supply 
of electricity. 
4 This and the following paragraph is based on Carlsson and Jacobsson (1997b). 
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specific investment decisions. At the same time, the network constrains 
the individual firm and limits its technology choice and growth 
(Lundgren and Nordenlöw, 1995). 
Institutions, both ‘hard’ ones, such as legislation or the educational 
system, and softer ones, such as culture. The roles of the different 
institutions vary; some promote a high connectivity in the system, 
whereas others influence the incentive structure. As is emphasised in 
institutional economics (for example Edquist and Johnson (1997)) and 
in the literature on innovation systems (for example Carlsson and 
Stankiewicz (1991) and Porter (1998)), institutions are important not 
only for the specific path a technology takes but also for the growth of 
firms. 
There are many technological systems in a country or region (for 
example one for genetic engineering and one for wind turbines). Each 
of the technological systems has unique features in terms of the 
constellation of actors and their competence, the character of the 
networks and the nature of the institutions. As a consequence, they 
vary in their ability to foster growth industries. 
However, industrial growth is not only influenced by factors specific 
to a technological system, but also by those that a range of 
technological systems has in common. For instance, legislation that for 
many years obstructed the development of a venture capital market in 
Sweden influenced the access to capital for a broad range of new 
technology based firms (Ohlsson, 1991; Karamömerlioglu and 
Jacobsson, 2000). Thus, our analytical framework cannot be limited to 
the technological system approach; we also need to consider elements 
drawn from other system approaches, in particular those which are of 
more general relevance within a country (for example national 
innovation system). 
This implies two potential problems of a methodological nature. 
First, how can we integrate different analytical approaches, where 
concepts and terms differ? Second, how do we define the borders of 
the system as we enlarge it with non-technology specific elements? 
Integrating different system approaches is possible since a scrutiny of 
the literature5 reveals that the system approaches have a shared 
                                                 
5 The following sections are based largely on Johnson (1998). The literature used covers 
work of the following authors: Bijker, Carlsson and Eliasson, Carlsson and Jacobsson, 
Carlsson and Stankiewicz, Dahmén, Dosi et. al., Edquist and Johnson, Eliasson, Galli and 
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understanding of a set of basic functions6 that are served in an 
innovation system. Each of these basic functions needs to be served if a 
new industry is to develop but, of course, they may be served in a 
variety of ways. For instance, capital can be supplied by specialised 
venture capital firms, customers, banks, suppliers or even firms 
acquiring another company. In the next paragraphs, we will elaborate 
on these functions.7 
The first, and maybe most obvious, function is to create ‘new’ 
knowledge.8 Bearing the definition of a technological system in mind, 
this function may also be viewed as an overall system goal. 
A second function is to guide the direction of the search process 
among suppliers of technology and customers, that is influence the 
direction in which actors deploy their resources. This function includes 
providing recognition of a growth potential (for example in terms of 
identifying technological opportunities and commercial viability), which 
is closely connected to the legitimacy that a new technology has in the 
eyes of various actors. It also includes guidance with respect to the 
choice of specific design configurations, for example through the 
identification of problems of a technical nature, changing factor prices, 
relationships to competent customers or various policy interventions. 
A third function is to supply resources, that is capital, competence, 
and other resources. Capital is needed to distribute risks and may come 
with competence, for instance in the form of venture capital. 
Competence refers to a whole range of competencies, including 
technological. Yet another type of resource may be those which are 
complementary to the new product. 
A fourth function is to facilitate the creation of positive external 
economies through the exchange of information, knowledge and 
visions. This function is a central part of the systemic approach to 
innovation and involves the formation of networks and meeting places 
and, perhaps, a change in culture.  
                                                                                                                            
Teubal, Hughes, Håkansson, Lundgren, Lundvall, Nelson, Porter, Saxenian. For detailed 
references, see Johnson and Jacobsson (1999). 
6 That is the contribution of a single component, a set of components or the entire system to 
the system’s (inexplicit) ‘goal’. 
7 In addition to the functions, there are a set of general incentives to innovation and firm 
growth, which are recognised in many approaches. For examples, see Johnson and 
Jacobsson (1999). 
8 For example through R&D, learning by everyday activities or imitation. 
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A fifth function is to facilitate the formation of markets. Markets are 
not always created in a spontaneous fashion but sometimes need to be 
stimulated, or even created. Some important aspects of facilitating the 
formation of markets may be to clear legislative or political obstacles 
and stimulate social acceptance by legitimising the new technology. 
The shared view among the system approaches of these 
fundamental functions permits us to integrate elements from different 
approaches. The functions also provide us with a tool for an empirical 
delineation of the system. In the context of an emerging technological 
system, we can define its borders by analysing what promotes or 
hinders the development of these functions. These factors may be fully 
technology specific, but may also influence several technological 
systems simultaneously. Hence, they can be derived from a system 
perspective using different units of analysis: technology, industry and 
nation.  
As mentioned above, all of these functions need to be served for a 
new industry to evolve and perform well, but there is a number of 
potential obstacles. Conventionally, these obstacles would be referred 
to as ‘market failures’. We refrain from using that terminology, as it is 
not meaningful to refer to deviations from a (neo-classical) ‘optimum’ 
in an uncertain, dynamic and complex world. Instead, our objective is 
only to find obstacles to the development of these functions in an 
emerging technological system, that is factors that tilt the selection 
environment in favour of incumbent technologies. These factors are 
found in the nature of actors and markets as well as in networks and 
institutions (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997a). A non-exhaustive list of 
obstacles and corresponding functions is found in table 2.1 and 
discussed below. 
TABLE 2.1: Examples of Obstacles to the Formation of Powerful Functions1 
OBSTACLES FUNCTIONS 
Actors and Markets  
 Poorly articulated demand Create knowledge, guide search, facilitate market form. 
 ‘Local’ search processes Guide search 
 Established technology 
characterised by increasing returns 
Guide search, facilitate market form. 
 Market control by incumbents  Guide search, facilitate market form. 
Networks  
 Poor connectivity Create external economies, facilitate market form. 
 Wrong guidance with respect to 
future markets 
Guide search, facilitate market form. 
Institutions  
 Legislative obstacles Guide search, facilitate market form.  
 Failures in the educational system Supply resources 
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 Skewed capital market Guide search, supply resources 
 Underdeveloped organisational 
and political power of new entrants 
Guide search, supply resources, create external 
economies, facilitate market form. 
Obstacles related to actors and markets may be prominent features 
of the selection environment and can shape the functions in several 
ways, thereby influencing the process of formation of a new 
technological system. Some examples are given below. 
In the early phase of the diffusion of a new technology, potential 
customers may not be able to articulate their demand (in terms of 
price/performance) and meet the supplier in the market place. In the 
absence of articulated customers, suppliers may neither receive the 
proper guidance for their search process nor be able to create new 
knowledge. A part of the formation of markets may therefore be the 
formulation and articulation of the demand from a set of fragmented, 
potential customers. 
‘Local’ search processes imply that the search space for new 
opportunities (Dosi, 1988) and problem solutions (Bijker, 1995; 
Fransman, 1990; Hughes, 1983) may be constrained; actors may build 
upon their existing knowledge base when they search for new 
opportunities (Dosi, 1988). This tends to restrict their technology 
choice to closely related areas in terms of both technologies and 
markets (Dosi et. al., 1990). Hence, history will guide the direction of 
the search process of the firms by influencing their ability to recognise 
new opportunities for growth. 
Many new technologies suffer from facing incumbent substitutes 
which have undergone a process of ‘increasing returns’ (Arthur, 1988). 
Thus, new products tend to have a high relative price (lack of scale and 
experience economies) and/or relatively low utility (poor performance, 
lack of network externalities and/or complementary products), which 
hinders the formation of markets and may guide the search process to 
other fields. 
Market control by dominant incumbents means that the selection 
process may not involve a ‘free’ choice by customers. Markets may 
therefore not be formed which may guide the search process of firms to 
other fields. 
The selection environment is also made up of networks and 
institutions. Like markets, networks do not necessarily grow 
spontaneously. As Saxenian (1994) argues, there may be institutional 
and organisational obstacles to the growth of a collective identity. If so, 
a ‘weak’ network failure would arise in the sense that actors are not 
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well connected to other actors. The system may then fail in the creation 
of positive externalities, and be unable to reduce social uncertainty 
about the new technology. 
A different form of network failure — a ‘strong‘ failure — could 
occur if individual firms are guided by others (that is by the network) in 
the ‘wrong' direction and/or fail to supply one another with the 
required knowledge. The source of a strong network failure lies in 
differing assumptions concerning future (missing) markets within 
various networks. Thus, the minus side of tight networks is that these 
contain considerable inertia. Competence will then be ‘locked-in’ and 
social acceptance (legitimacy) of the new technology will be delayed. 
Institutions may fail to shape a propitious context for the formation 
of a new technological system. For example, current legislation may 
guide the search process towards the ‘incumbent’ technology by 
influencing relative prices of different alternatives. The educational 
system may fail to react quickly enough to the emergence of new 
technologies and therefore negatively influence the supply of 
competence and, as a consequence, the ability to identify and exploit 
new opportunities. The capital market may not respond 
‘spontaneously’ to the need of a new technological system (Carlsson 
and Jacobsson, 1997b), which would influence the supply of both 
capital and competence. This would, in turn, influence the legitimacy of 
the new product and, therefore, guide firms in their search process. 
Finally, a new technology may suffer from weakly organised actors. For 
example, industrial associations may be weak, which may lead to a 
poor ability to articulate the need for legislative change and influence 
the supply of competence. Lack of organisational power may also 
influence social acceptance of the new technology and the formation of 
meeting places for the exchange of information and knowledge.  
Clearly, there is a range of obstacles to the formation of powerful 
functions needed for the evolution of new industries, which may act 
independently but are likely to reinforce one another. For instance, a 
strong network failure would reinforce local search processes or lead to 
an absence of pressure for legislative change in favour of the new 
technology. Indeed, the existence of these potential obstacles would 
lead us to expect that the formation of a new industry is a process that 
is long and hard to predict. 
In the empirical analysis in section four, we will trace how the nature 
of actors, markets, networks and institutions shaped the formation of 
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the Swedish industry supplying renewable energy technology. Next we 
will introduce the reader to the technologies studied and provide a 
preliminary assessment of the performance of Swedish industry in this 
field. 
3. THE TECHNOLOGIES AND AN ASSESSMENT OF SWEDISH 
PERFORMANCE 
Our enquiry is focused on wind turbines, solar collectors and 
equipment for biomass combustion and gasification. Wind turbines 
produce power, solar collectors produce heat and biomass is primarily 
used in heat production, but can also be used as a fuel in a power plant. 
In the biomass field, we focus on biomass gasification for combined 
heat and power (CHP) production and on conventional combustion 
technology for heat production in different applications. 
3.1 WIND TURBINES 
Wind turbines of modern design and application date back to the end 
of the 1970s, but the accumulated capacity in the world did not exceed 
2 GW until 1991. The rate of diffusion has been quite high since then; 
the annual average cumulative growth rate between 1990 and 1998 was 
nearly 25 per cent, reaching a capacity of 10 GW in 1998 (Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 1999; BTM, 1999). The largest markets9 in the 1990s (1992-
1997) were Germany, India, Denmark, Spain and the Netherlands. 
Sweden trailed behind and ranks as number six in terms of stock per 
capita (Johnson and Jacobsson, 1999). 
There are currently seven Swedish firms in the business of 
manufacturing wind turbines. Three design large or medium sized 
turbines (250 kW-3 MW) and four very small turbines (<100 kW). 
None of the firms designing large turbines have begun series 
production and the firms producing small turbines supply very few 
units. Thus, although there is a fair number of firms active in the 
industry, the Swedish market share is negligible. 
The technological strength of Sweden is not negligible, however. In 
the general field of mechanical and electrical engineering Swedish 
industry is quite strong technically. In the specific field of wind turbines, 
                                                 
9 The data refer to net increase in stocks. 
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sectoral research, development and demonstration (RD&D) money of 
some magnitude has been spent within government-funded 
programmes. This has resulted in competence to design very large wind 
turbines, the development of a unique light weight wind turbine design, 
competence as well as an innovation in the field of generators (direct-
drive generator) and advanced competence in development tools for 
the analysis of aerodynamic properties of wind turbines. 
However, very little money from industrial sources has, so far, been 
spent on technological development, but this may be about to change. 
One of the Swedish firms, Nordic Windpower, recently (November 
1998) received funding from a number of venture capital firms and 
changed from being a development company to one with greater 
ambitions. Another firm, Kvaerner Turbin (with a history in the 
industry from 1977), which until recently had only supplied a couple of 
very large wind turbines to government sponsored programmes has 
now a growing interest in the currently expanding offshore market.At 
the same time, several new firms have entered the industry, supplying 
very small turbines. 
3.2 SOLAR COLLECTORS 
Solar collectors also date back to the end of the 1970s. The annual 
demand in Europe increased from a little over 200 000 m2 in 1990 to 
500 000 m2 in 1994, which corresponds to an annual cumulative growth 
of about 15 percent (Johnson and Jacobsson, 1999). The total installed 
glazed collector area in Europe was about 4.6 million m2 in 1994, 
corresponding to an energy supply of roughly 2.7 TWh/year (ESIF, 
1995). The installed area in Japan and the US was approximately 6 and 
5 million m2 respectively, which suggests that the world production of 
energy by solar collectors was roughly 9 TWh/year. Since 1995, the 
diffusion of solar collectors has increased greatly in several European 
countries. In Germany, the annual market grew almost 170 percent 
from 1994 to 1998 (Mangold, 1999), and the Austrian market seems to 
have stabilised on approximately 200 000 m2 per year (Weiss, 1999).10 
The largest European markets (excluding Greece) are Austria and 
Germany. Sweden ranks as number 6 in terms of stock per capita, due 
to an early diffusion of some magnitude. However, in the 1990s the 
                                                 
10 We have not been able to locate data for Europe as a whole. 
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Swedish market has stagnated whereas those in other European 
countries, in particular in Denmark, Switzerland, Germany and 
Austria, have developed very well. Thus, the Swedish market is falling 
even further behind those of other European countries (Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 1999).  
As in other countries, the Swedish industry supplying solar collectors 
consists of small firms. The largest, Technoterm, has a sales volume of 
roughly 10 000 m2 and there are even a few smaller firms with an 
annual supply of a few hundred m2.  
Swedish firms do not normally export solar collectors but 
Technoterm has a large share of the European market for absorbers 
(20 percent). Imports are frequent (ESIF, 1996), which means that the 
market share of Swedish firms is less than the Swedish share of the 
annual European instalments of complete solar collectors. The latter 
was less than three per cent in 1994 (ESIF, 1995). 
About half of the Swedish market is a ‘do it yourself’market (ESIF, 
1996), aimed at a small niche of ‘green’ customers. This clearly shows its 
underdeveloped status.11 There are, though, some efforts being made 
to reach new market segments, such as building companies, real-estate 
companies and hospitals. This market diversification is stimulated both 
by academic initiatives and by government programmes. Recently a 
more powerful actor has entered the industry from a related industry 
(tanks for accumulating heat), which may mean that these new 
segments will be approached with greater force. 
In terms of technological competence, the Swedish position is 
somewhat better. There is substantial experience in large scale 
applications since Sweden was among the pioneers in building district 
heating systems, sponsored by government RD&D (Andrén, 1998; 
ESIF, 1996). The academic competence is relatively strong and the 
leading energy company in Sweden (government-owned Vattenfall) is 
pursuing advanced R&D in solar collectors. Finally, as mentioned 
above, Technoterm has a strong European position in the absorber 
field. 
                                                 
11 In the larger and very rapidly growing Austrian market, this share was only 20 percent in 
1996 (IEA, 1998). 
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3.3 BIOMASS 
In the biomass field, diffusion is very substantial in Sweden as 
compared to the rest of Europe. Whereas biomass contributed to about 
91 TWh in 1997, which amounted to 19 percent of the energy supply in 
Sweden (STEM, 1998), the total for the European Union was 
approximately 520 TWh (European Commission, 1997). This figure is, 
however, expected to have tripled by the year 2010 (European 
Commission, 1997), implying an expected average cumulative growth 
rate of almost 9 percent. 
In Sweden, biomass is increasingly being used in CHP production 
and more advanced technical solutions based on gasification are being 
developed and tested for that purpose. Moreover, nursing homes, 
schools and hospitals are beginning to use biofuelled boilers for 
heating, and pellet burners are diffusing to single households. In 
connection to these new applications and technologies, a system of 
related products and services is developing (equipment and plants for 
fuel production, fuel distribution systems, quality approval procedures 
and so on.).  
In many of these areas, Swedish firms are pioneers. This applies to 
technology to use gasified biomass, where TPS and Kvaerner Chemrec 
are in the international forefront technically (but we have yet to see the 
first full-scale applications in the Swedish market). It also applies to 
pellet burners for single households where there are now about 20 
small Swedish firms producing burners. There is a substantial 
production of pellets, primarily for district heating plants, and there are 
some strong Swedish suppliers of biofuel boilers for medium sized 
applications (such as schools). These Swedish firms have a good 
position locally, especially in the heating segment, but do not export to 
any great extent. Finally, the level of Swedish competence with respect 
to combustion of biofuels and related technologies is quite high; 
Sweden has a long tradition of burning such fuels, and a substantial 
amount of money (700 million SEK) has been channelled into 
academia via governmental programmes for research on combustion 
technology in general (SOU, 1992). 
The picture that emerges is one where the technical competence in 
Sweden is quite high in RET. However, the performance in terms of 
both the diffusion and, in particular, the development of a Swedish 
supplier industry, is questionable. With the exception of Technoterm in 
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solar collectors and a few firms supplying medium sized biomass 
boilers, the results are quite meagre in terms of growth of new firms. 
4. INDUCEMENT AND BLOCKING MECHANISMS12 
In this section, we will attempt to explain the pattern above in terms of 
the workings of a set of mechanisms that induce or block the 
development of powerful functions of the nature discussed in the 
analytical framework. In table 4.1, we specify these mechanisms and 
show which functions they have had affected. We will thereafter 
analyse each of these mechanisms. 
TABLE 4.1: Inducement and blocking mechanisms 
BLOCKING 
MECHANISMS 
 FUNCTIONS  INDUCEMENT 
MECHANISMS 
Characteristics of 
new technology 
    
  Create new knowledge  EFUD funding 
Weak network 
failure 
    
  Guide the direction of 
the search processa 
 Investment subsidies 
Weak 
organisational 
power 
    
  Supply resources  Measures affecting 
relative prices 
Lack of 
competence 
among customers 
    
  Create positive 
external economies 
 Competent customers in 
municipal utilities.  
Lock-in to 
established 
technologies 
    
  Facilitate market 
formation 
 Environmental concern 
(municipalities) 
Lack of long-term 
governmental 
vision 
    
a Recognise potential for growth, guide technology choice and legitimise. 
                                                 
12 This section is based on interviews with a number of firms supplying renewable energy 
technology, industry associations, customers and so on. For more information, see Johnson 
and Jacobsson (1999). 
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4.1 INDUCEMENT MECHANISMS 
Most of the inducement mechanisms emanate from government policy 
measures. The relative importance of these measures differs between 
technologies, although a few of them apply to the whole field. 
4.1.1 EFUD FUNDING 
In 1975, Swedish government began funding programmes for research, 
development and demonstration in the energy field (EFUD 
programmes). The late 1970s and early 1980s were characterised by an 
ambition to decrease the dependency on oil, which resulted in 
programmes oriented towards applied R&D and demonstration (IVA, 
1992). These were sizeable compared to other OECD countries 
(Johnson and Jacobsson, 1999). 
In the mid-1980s, the programme was redirected towards long-term 
and basic research and the EFUD activities moved from industry to 
academia (IVA, 1992). Moreover, the size of the programmes was 
substantially reduced, which particularly affected the development, 
demonstration and commercialisation part of the programme 
(Energiforskningsgruppen, 1992). 
In total, approximately 4.5 billion SEK of EFUD funding have been 
channelled into the field of renewable energy sources. Of this funding, 
bioenergy, wind power and solar energy have received approximately 
50, 20 and 30 percent respectively (Johnson and Jacobsson 1999). So 
far, the results have primarily been increased knowledge and 
competence in the field of RET, especially within academia, and the 
creation of new networks between actors with related activities. 
4.1.2 INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES 
In the 1990s, the redirection of EFUD towards basic research was 
partly compensated by investment subsidies aiming at promoting 
market formation. The support for bioenergy has again dominated; out 
of a total funding of approximately 2.6 billion SEK, almost 80 percent 
has been directed towards bioenergy, especially CHP plants. Thus, the 
relationship between support for technological development and 
support for market formation is almost one to one in this field. In 
contrast, the focus on RD&D is apparent in the fields of wind power 
and solar energy, where market support has only amounted to 30 and 
25 percent of the EFUD funding. 
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4.1.3 MEASURES AFFECTING RELATIVE PRICES 
Government has also implemented measures to stimulate market 
formation by changing relative prices. The energy and carbon dioxide 
taxes on fossil fuels are higher than on RETs. Small-scale (1,5 MW) 
producers of electricity are guaranteed a minimum price (currently a 
good 0.03 USD/kWh), which provides them with a market for their 
surplus electricity. In the wind power field, producers receive an 
environmental bonus of approximately 0.01 USD/kWh. However, in 
spite of these measures, the relative prices are unfavourable except for 
biofuel-based heat production. 
4.1.4 COMPETENT CUSTOMERS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 
In addition to government policy, there are two other main inducement 
mechanisms. First, municipal energy companies are very competent 
customers. They can articulate a demand, which not only helps in the 
process of market formation and guides the direction of search for 
suppliers but also creates legitimacy for the RETs, in particular for 
biofuelled boilers. Second, the general concern for environmental 
issues stimulates market formation. Again, this is especially apparent 
for municipal energy companies, which often choose environmental-
friendly technologies, but there is also a growing demand from industry 
for ‘green electricity’, for instance from the Swedish Rail company.  
4.2 BLOCKING MECHANISMS 
4.2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
Some blocking mechanisms are inherent in situations where new firms 
are trying to enter an established market with new and unknown 
technologies and are, thus, present in all technological areas (including 
RET) and innovation systems. The incumbent technologies are well 
known and legitimate and have a better price/performance ratio, partly 
due to processes of increasing returns to adoption. In addition, 
customer uncertainty with respect to the technological performance 
and the economic benefits of the new substitute is often large. Some 
functions, for example stimulation of market formation and direction of 
the search process, may therefore not be adequately served. 
However, the impact of blocking mechanisms due to technology 
characteristics may vary between innovation systems, since innovation 
systems have different abilities to counteract them. Thus, the important 
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thing to notice in the Swedish RET case is not the mere presence of 
such blocking mechanisms, but rather the failure of the Swedish 
innovation system to balance their negative impact by ensuring that 
neglected functions were served in other ways. 
4.2.2 WEAK NETWORK FAILURE 
The relationships between RET firms are generally very weak. For the 
larger firms, this lack of co-operation may be due to a lack of potential 
partners; for example, there are only two or three producers of large-
scale biofuel boilers in Sweden. For small firms, the poor connectivity 
of the system may partly be due to lack of information about other 
actors. Many small RET firms also are fairly individualistic, which 
makes them unwilling to co-operate and share their knowledge with 
other firms. In addition, some of the RET firms which have been in 
business for some time are somewhat antagonistic to new entrants. This 
antagonism is especially apparent within the fields of solar collectors 
and small and medium-scale biofuel combustion technology; in fact, a 
quality certification procedure for solar collectors was developed partly 
as a means to eliminate small, ‘unprofessional’ producers from the 
market.13 
There are weak relationships between RET firms and firms 
providing related products and services, such as installation firms, 
suppliers of fuel and so on. Poor connectivity between RET firms and 
the users is also common in all three fields. There are a couple of 
exceptions, though. Some bioenergy firms have continuous 
relationships with their customers and use them for technological 
development, and Vattenfall has been strongly connected to several of 
the Swedish wind turbine manufacturers. 
Connectivity between RET firms and academia is of varying quality; 
whereas the firms with large-scale or advanced technology have well-
developed relationships with different universities or technical 
institutes,14 most firms with small-scale or simpler technology have had 
little or no such contacts. The lack of connectivity is not only due to 
lack of information about academic research and personnel but also to 
a large cultural distance between the two groups. 
                                                 
13 It costs too much for many small firms, even though their products may very well be good 
enough to pass the tests.  
14 In fact, several of these firms are spin-offs from universities or technological institutes. 
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Hence, although there are some exceptions, the connectivity 
between actors can be considered to be poor in the whole system. This 
means that positive external economies will not be properly generated, 
which has a set of implications. 
First, there is an absence of the learning element in strong user-
supplier relationships where the user provides an input to the 
innovation process, both by articulating its demand and providing 
feedback of technical nature. One result of this absence is a focus on 
performance rather than on price/performance ratio in the fields of 
solar collectors. 
Second, problems are poorly, and wrongly, specified and the 
responsibility to solve problems falls between stools. This effect is 
especially apparent for solar collector and pellet burners. For example, 
customers have experienced a problem with their pellet burners, which 
is a consequence of burners and fuel not being adapted to each other. 
Pellet manufacturers claim that it is due to the burner, whereas pellet 
burner manufacturers blame it on irregular fuel quality. Collaboration 
between these firms, which have a common interest in the expansion of 
the market for pellet burners, would probably have led to a clearer 
articulation of the problem. As Chalmers University of Technology 
does research on related issues and already knows the cause of the 
problem, a solution would have been found through a close 
relationship with these researchers. 
Third, weak links between RET firms and users make it difficult to 
exchange information, for example about existing technical options and 
their relative performances, which creates customer uncertainty and, 
thus, blocks market formation. Market formation is also blocked by a 
poor connectivity between RET firms and firms supplying 
complementary products, which causes customers to experience 
problems with co-ordination and uncertainty about the overall 
responsibility for the project. 
4.2.3 WEAK ORGANISATIONAL POWER 
There are basically three industry associations for renewable energy in 
Sweden, one for each renewable energy source: SVEBIO (the Swedish 
Bioenergy Association), SEAS (Solar Energy Association of Sweden), 
and SVIF (Swedish Wind Power Association). In addition, SERO (The 
National Organisation of Swedish Energy Associations) works within 
all three fields (and some others) to promote domestic energy sources.  
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However, with the exception of SVEBIO, these associations are 
relatively weak and lack resources. They have problems influencing 
policy and creating legitimacy for the new technologies, which blocks 
the recognition of the field as a potential growth area. Moreover, weak 
associations cannot function as bridging institutions and convey 
industry problems to, for example, academia. 
4.2.4 LACK OF COMPETENCE AMONG POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS 
Many of the RETs open up new market segments. Small-scale products 
(for example pellet burners, solar collectors and small wind turbines) 
are suitable for single households; medium-scale products (for example 
some biofuel boilers) are used by industrial firms or by municipalities 
and county councils (in schools, nursing homes, hospitals and so on.); 
some large-scale products (for example black liquor gasification plants, 
large biofuel boilers and so on.) are aimed at industrial firms. This 
market diversification for energy technology is plagued with several 
problems which hinder market formation. 
With the exception of industrial firms, these new segments are not 
used to making this type of investment decisions. For example, county 
council purchasers who usually buy standard products (for example 
paper plates) in large quantities for hospitals and nursing homes do not 
necessarily have the competence needed to make investment decisions 
about energy production equipment. Single-house owners make this 
type of investment decision maybe once every thirty years when their 
boilers are to be replaced. Thus, in many cases, new customers lack the 
competence needed not only to invest in RET but also to articulate 
their demand. 
Whereas acquiring this competence is a learning process for some, 
say municipal authorities and owners of apartment houses, many of 
these segments can neither be expected to gain the necessary 
competence to invest in renewable energy technology in a reasonably 
cost-efficient way, nor to be able to articulate their demand. 
Intermediaries therefore need to come forth. However, with the 
exception of the wind power field there is a lack of such intermediaries. 
Hence, slow market formation is not only the result of incompetent 
customers but also of a lack of ‘bridging institutions’. 
 19 
4.2.5 LOCK-IN TO ESTABLISHED TECHNOLOGIES 
The ambiguous acting of some of the established customers (especially 
the large power companies) blocks market formation. For example, 
although Vattenfall has made investment in RD&D and states its 
commitment to renewable energy sources, it had only bought 4 
commercial wind turbines by 1990 and 38 by 1998 (Averstad, 1998). 
This type of ambiguous behaviour adds to the uncertainty perceived by 
other customers, firms and investors. Thus, the power companies 
influence the demand not only directly (by not buying the equipment), 
but also indirectly (by blocking the creation of legitimacy and the 
recognition of potential for growth). 
This ambiguity presumably reflects a lock-in phenomenon due to 
‘local search’ among the big power companies who favour large-scale 
technologies.15 The interest in large-scale technologies clearly follows 
the pattern at Vattenfall, which is dominated by hydro and nuclear 
power. These technologies have been the measures by which all new 
technologies have been assessed. Since only such large-scale 
technologies can have a significant influence on the power balance in 
the short and medium run, other technologies have been deemed to be 
of little interest. 
The inclination towards large-scale technologies became even more 
evident as Vattenfall had to follow government instructions to prepare 
for the phasing-out of nuclear power. The strengthened inclination had 
implications not only for the continued choice of wind turbines in MW 
size (which induced Kvaerner to continue to develop these (a strong 
network failure)), but also for the rejection of a new biomass 
gasification process, which was not as large-scale as the one Vattenfall 
favoured in the early 1990s. 
The lock-in of these actors is but a part of a larger phenomenon 
related to norms and values in the society at large regarding energy 
technologies. Sweden as a whole seems to be caught in a ‘nuclear 
power trauma’, which reduces all energy issues to one: the phasing-out 
of nuclear power. Renewable energy is seen, by politicians and others, 
only as a means to replace nuclear power and all programmes to induce 
further diffusion of RETs are justified in that context. 
                                                 
15 This is not a uniquely Swedish problem, see European Commission (1999). 
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This trauma has two consequences for RET. First, in general (and 
not only for Vattenfall) the value of each RET is judged in relation to 
how many nuclear power reactors it can replace. For small scale 
technologies, it is but a fraction, at least in the short and medium term, 
which further weakens the legitimacy of RET and contributes to an 
inability to recognise the growth potential of RET. 16  
Second, RET is perceived by many as a threat to the continued 
availability of cheap nuclear power and, therefore, as a threat to 
Swedish industry and welfare. The consequent lack of legitimacy of 
RET in the eyes of industry and large parts of the media has 
influenced, in a strongly negative fashion, all the basic functions that 
need to be fulfilled if a new industry is to be formed. In particular, the 
search process has been directed away from renewable energy 
technologies, which has constrained the supply of resources flowing 
into the field and obstructed the process of market formation. It is 
notable in this context that none of the large Swedish firms have 
entered the industry even though it clearly needs a ‘prime mover’. 
4.2.6 LACK OF LONG-TERM GOVERNMENTAL VISION 
A lack of a long-term governmental vision of the role of RETs in the 
Swedish energy system has blocked the functions in several ways. First, 
as long as the government’s expectations of the future of RETs in 
Sweden are unclear, the technologies will continue to lack legitimacy 
and their growth potential in the global market will not be recognised. 
Second, the lack of a governmental vision results in inconsistent policy 
measures, which have led to an erratic demand, biases in the 
technology choice away from new technology and undue uncertainties. 
Government attempts to stimulate the market for RET directly 
through subsidies have resulted in large fluctuations in the market. For 
example, when government announced its intentions to investigate 
whether or not to subsidise pellet burners, the market ceased to exist 
until the decision was made and the subsidies implemented. Later, 
when the funds for a particular year were finished, government 
                                                 
16 There are even some indications that incumbent actors are afraid to promote the 
development of RET since they believe that, by doing so, they will provide the government 
with an excuse to shut down all nuclear power plants. 
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announced the possibility of new subsidies the following year, which 
destroyed the market once more.  
An equally serious effect of time-limited investment subsidies is that 
they may lock-in the market to old technology unless technological 
newness is a prerequisite for receiving support. For example, the CHP 
support (1991-1996) attracted customers who would have been 
interested in investing in new gasification technology. This occurred 
even though there were also polices promoting the development of that 
technology; the support was not high enough to compensate for the 
higher technological risk. Now, these customers have all invested in 
conventional CHP technology, which makes Sweden a ‘dead’ market 
for the new gasification technology. 
There are further inconsistencies magnifying uncertainties for 
prospective investors. One source is related to parts of the legislation 
and regulations, which counteract the effect of market stimulating 
measures. In particular, due to unclear rules for granting building 
permits for wind turbines, customers hesitate to make the investment. 
There is also an uncertainty about the future levels of taxes on 
alternative fuels, which increases the (inherent – see above) difficulties 
for customers to estimate the economic benefits of the RET. The 
taxation rules have been altered a number of times, which has led to 
substantial changes in RET competitiveness. For example, in the tax 
reform of 1993, industry was relieved of the energy tax and received 
large reductions in the CO2 tax, which deprived biofuels of their earlier 
advantage. 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
In order to develop an industry supplying RET, as well as speed up the 
local diffusion of RET, there is a need for policies to address all the 
blocking mechanisms discussed above. First and foremost, policy must 
unlock the ‘nuclear trauma’, nurtured over a period of two decades. 
‘Unlocking’ requires the separation of the nuclear issue from the 
renewable one.  
This should not be difficult, in principle, because the electricity 
market is no longer national – it is Nordic and is beginning to be a 
European market. Hence, due to deregulation and internationalisation, 
the energy market is no longer a closed market where the diffusion of 
one technology (for example wind power) entails the replacement of 
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another (for example nuclear power). This opens up for any country to 
become a large net exporter of electricity. The potential to develop a 
large net export of ‘clean’ electricity is particularly significant in the era 
of ‘global warming.’ Policy makers must therefore stop motivating 
investments in RET with a need for replacing nuclear power. They 
should instead work towards the fulfilment of a European electricity 
market where power can be exported in larger quantities from Sweden 
and, induced by appropriate legislation, replace electricity generated by 
fossil fuels on the continent. Only then can we bypass the trauma and 
open up for a larger interest in RET by the business sector, financial 
institutions and potential customers.  
Second, policy makers need to develop a vision of a future energy 
system with a substantially larger RET component. Such a vision is 
necessary in order for uncertainty to be reduced, for legislative changes 
to take place and for existing legislation to be an interpreted in a 
manner which speeds up the diffusion process, for instance by 
government bodies dealing with building permits for wind turbines. A 
vision is also required for various types of intermediaries, both firms 
and municipal authorities, to be formed in greater numbers and aid in 
the process of forming new markets.  
With an explicit vision it will be easier to develop consistent policies 
promoting RET. which is of central importance to reduce the 
uncertainty inherent in new substitutes. However, not only consistency 
but also timing of market stimulation measures is important to the local 
supplier industry. In the wind turbine field, Swedish market stimulation 
programmes began in 1991, several years after Denmark, Germany and 
Holland (Carlman, 1990). Not surprisingly, these countries were able to 
develop a supplier industry based on the local market. In the solar 
collector field, an early Swedish market stimulated the emergence of a 
local supplier industry. As market stimulation policies ended in Sweden 
while they greatly expanded abroad in the 1990s, the Swedish suppliers 
are now disadvantaged compared to their competitors in Germany, 
Denmark and Austria. In biomass, Swedish suppliers are presently in 
an advantageous position as the local market is relatively large, but we 
have yet to see a first large-scale investment in gasified biomass and the 
suppliers of pellet and biofuel burners have yet to become strong 
internationally. Hence, a patient policy stimulating the market is also 
required. 
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The specific policy measures may be of various sorts but must be 
based on an understanding of the precise nature of the blocking 
mechanisms. In acquiring that understanding, two features of the 
evolution of a new industry need to be borne in mind: 
First, in the diffusion of a new technology, we may distinguish 
between the first niche markets that consists of early adopters; bridging 
markets that allow for larger volumes of production and mass markets, 
that will make the product a commodity. The technological system 
needs to fill the various functions throughout the life of the industry, 
that is not only in the initial creation of niche markets, but also in the 
transition to bridging and mass markets. For instance, in the case of 
solar collectors, we are presently in the transition phase from the first 
niche markets of ‘green’ single house owners to bridging markets of, for 
example, real estate companies. For a transition to take place, these 
new segments must find solar collectors a legitimate technology and the 
producers of solar collectors need to be guided in their search processes 
to the specific needs of these new segments. In addition, a successful 
transition involves developing new user-supplier relations (create new 
networks) as well as acquiring new resources (supply of capital and 
complementary resources). Policies must, therefore, be designed to 
strengthen the functions that are weak in this particular transition 
period. 
Second, there must be an awareness that there are various feedback 
loops in the innovation and diffusion process (Kline and Rosenberg, 
1986) and in the evolution of a new cluster (Porter, 1998). This means 
that policies may have a greater effect than what is initially anticipated. 
Again, in the case of solar collectors, a procurement policy which 
identifies, educates and organises potential customers would 
presumably strengthen not only the formation of new markets but also 
foster new networks between customers and suppliers (facilitating the 
creation of external economies) and improve the legitimacy of solar 
collectors. 
Bearing these features in mind, the policy objectives may include an 
improvement in the price/performance of RET. The precise policy 
measures can be wider than investment subsidies; policies making sure 
that the RETs’ distinct environmental advantage is reflected in the 
relative price of energy are just as important. Moreover, given the 
inherent uncertainties involved in investing in new technology, policy 
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should favour instruments that give a high degree of predictability to 
the outcome of an investment. 
Policy may also be aimed directly at the supplier industry. Lack of 
organisational strength of the new industry has contributed to the poor 
legitimacy of renewables, with all its implications. The firms simply 
need industry associations that can participate in the political process. 
There is, therefore, a need for policies that improve the organisational 
strength of the new industries.  
With some exceptions, there are weaknesses in the networks; in the 
relations between the firms, their customers and academia. As 
networks are conducive to the diffusion of resources, guide the search 
process of firms, influence what is recognised as a potential for growth 
as well as the formation of markets, the underdevelopment of the 
networks have led to problems with all the functions necessary for the 
formation of the new industry. Policies are therefore required to induce 
more dense networks and create bridging institutions. 
Procurement policies have a potential to influence several of the 
functions. Not only do they influence market formation in a very direct 
way but they may also guide the search of supplying firms and by 
building new networks, facilitate the creation of external economies. 
Procurement can be implemented within the framework of specific 
programmes but large power companies, such as Vattenfall, which, by 
the very nature of its dominant position, should not be allowed to 
continue to act like any other customer, can also undertake it. 
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